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Fossil-fuelled development and the legacy of Post-Development theory  
in twenty-first century Africa* 
 
The last 40 years can be called the age of development. This epoch is coming to an 
end. The time is ripe to write its obituary.  
-- Wolfgang Sachs, 1992 
 
We have got to be so impatient with moving Africa forward relentlessly – we have no 
choice. In 2025 there is absolutely no reason why Africa should not be totally lit up 
with the power it needs to industrialise… 
-- Akinwumi Adesina, 2016 
 
Introduction 
This article examines the legacy of post-development theory, in particular its 
relevance and applicability to debates about Africa’s future. Post-colonial Africa’s 
marginal position in the global economy and international system of states1, combined 
with the propensity of orthodox development scholars to graft an essentially Western 
modernisation trajectory onto blueprints for socio-economic development in Africa2, 
ought to have made the continent a fertile target for heterodox scholars considering 
alternatives forms of development and even alternatives to development. As pointed 
out by Matthews in one of the key contributions to post-development theory in Africa, 
‘many of the factors that led to the disillusionment of post-development theorists are 
prominent in Africa’.3 Nevertheless she also makes it clear that ‘post-development 																																																								*	Forthcoming	in	Third	World	Quarterly,	special	issue	on	‘25	years	after	the	Development	Dictionary:	Post-Development	and	its	consequences’.	
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has had little to say about Africa’.4 Indeed, it is not clear whether post-development 
theory and attendant societal critiques of development that proliferated in the last few 
decades of the twentieth century have had any lasting effect on how development is 
pursued in twenty-first century Africa.  
To evaluate this question of post-development theory’s legacy and its 
relevance to contemporary Africa, the article examines what lessons can be drawn by 
scrutinising post-development theory, and its claims about the end of development, 
through the prisms of Africa’s pursuit of development and its political economy of 
energy. It considers the impact of these aspects of Africa’s continued developmental 
efforts on the ability of post-development theory to provide insights into recent 
developments, such as the ideational and normative ramifications of pursuing socio-
economic development by means of an intensifying exploitation of Africa’s fossil 
fuels in the current context of an increasing emphasis globally on renewable sources 
of energy and a transition to a low carbon economy. Revisiting basic claims of post-
development theory provides insights into the enduring disconnect and 
incommensurability between Africa’s twenty-first century socio-economic trajectories 
and the core assumptions of post-development theory. 
 
Development, exhausted and rejuvenated 
The body of scholarship referred to as post-development theory constitutes the most 
fundamental critique and, for some of its adherents, total rejection of the modern 
notion of development as it emerged and became concretised in various policies and 
projects in the decades following World War II.5 Ziai identifies two main strands of 
post-development theory: a ‘sceptical’ one and a ‘neo-populist’ one. Neo-populism 
constitutes a more sweeping critique that is essentially ‘anti-development’ and prone 
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to romanticise tradition and community. The ‘sceptical’ approach entails a more 
nuanced criticism commensurate with the emergence of a ‘radical democratic’ 
approach to development studies, wherein criticism of development recognises the 
political and economic power structures within which any fruitful debate on radical 
alternatives to the status quo must be located.6 The ‘neo-populist’ strand corresponds 
largely to what Simon describes as ‘anti-development’.7 While the developments and 
trajectories identified in this article can more straightforwardly contribute to a 
refutation of the core claims of anti-development, they pose, as recently argued by 
Matthews8, serious questions for more nuanced versions of post-development theory 
too.  
The opening declaration of Sachs’s Development Dictionary in 1992 asserted 
that the era of development, predicated on modernisation by means of deepening the 
structures of capitalism including global economic integration, had proven itself 
unable to deliver the growing populations of the formerly colonised world from 
exploitation, poverty and related hardships.9 There had been, echoing Heilbroner’s 
memorable phrase, no ‘great ascent’ of Empire’s downtrodden10, but rather what 
Pritchett a few decades later described as ‘divergence, big time’ between Global 
North and South.11 Nowhere, it seemed, was that failure more pronounced than in 
Africa. The colonial history of Africa was one in which the continent’s many 
misfortunes (oftentimes external in origin) have been combined and utilised by 
imperial rulers and scholars alike to produce a view of the continent as essentially 
inadequate, a place of systemic failure in terms of its ability to engage with and 
partake in the modern world.12  
Despite rhetorical shifts in the post-colonial era, the core aspects of this 
Western view on Africa persisted and seemed also vindicated by empirical evidence. 
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In sharp contrast to Africa’s developmental potential as identified in the influential 
1981 World Bank report, Accelerated Development in Sub-Saharan Africa, 13  the 
1980s saw the entrenchment and deepening of economic crises, violent conflicts and 
human suffering across the continent – indeed a ‘Lost Decade’. 14  Africa’s 
developmental failures were documented in seminal works dissecting what Sandbrook 
described as the continent’s ‘economic stagnation’, 15  and van de Walle as its 
‘permanent crisis’. 16  An even more damning verdict emerged from Easterly and 
Levine’s influential study: ‘Africa’s economic history since 1960 fits the classical 
definition of tragedy: potential unfulfilled, with disastrous consequences’.17 Given the 
litany of failures, Africans were presumably yearning for alternatives to what was 
generally referred to by its critics as the modern development project, whether in its 
capitalist, socialist or Third Way guise.  
Sachs and his colleagues identified the end of WWII and the emergence of the 
Cold War, and of the United States as the pre-eminent global power, as the beginning 
of the Era of Development, 18  as would subsequently Rist in his History of 
Development. 19  But while Sachs, and many post-development theorists with him, 
believed that, by the 1990s, this era has come to an end, we can still observe 
development’s lodestar – the modern, industrialised and technologically advanced 
market state – shining bright across the firmament of the Southern skies. The primary 
difference today is that the notion of development is less Western-centric.20  
A range of developmental models, all squarely embedded in the overarching 
context of modernisation are now on offer and thus competing with the Washington 
Consensus,21 a model that has also been reconsidered and revised.22 New offerings 
range from that of Chinese state capitalism, constituting the most significant 
competitor with the Western model, to various others as exemplified by the diverse 
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examples of the BRICs (Brazil, Russia, India and China),23 and perhaps even in some 
extreme hybrid form the rapid and petroleum-fuelled modernisation of the Gulf states 
and their increasingly prominent role in global economic affairs.24 This diversity of 
approaches to development is a reminder of Simon’s caution, that references in the 
anti- and post-development literature to a single or homogeneous ‘development 
project ... is unhelpful, as there neither was nor is such a monolithic or singular 
construction, even during the heyday of modernization in the 1960s and early 
1970s.’25 
 
Persistent pursuit of development 
If there is a waning of the West in terms of its influence globally, this does not mean 
the end of development. The strategic framework of the African Union’s 2001 New 
Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD), which constitutes the key pan-
African statement of the continent’s ambitions for the twenty-first century, focuses 
squarely on the goal of sustained development by means of economic growth and 
poverty reduction.26 There is in NEPAD’s declaration no substantial deviation from 
the key assumptions that have underpinned the Era of Development. It constitutes, 
according to Owusu’s charting of Africa’s developmental policy journey from the 
Dependency-inspired Lagos Plan to NEPAD, an ‘endorsement of neoliberalism’.27 
 
What is needed is a commitment on the part of governments, the private sector 
and other institutions of civil society, to genuine integration of all nations into 
the global economy and body politic. This requires the recognition of global 
interdependence with regard to production and demand, the environmental 
base that sustains the planet, cross-border migration, a global financial 
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architecture that rewards good socio-economic management, and global 
governance that recognises partnership among all peoples. We hold that it is 
within the capacity of the international community to create fair and just 
conditions in which Africa can participate effectively in the global economy 
and body politic.28 
 
While then South African president Thabo Mbeki enveloped these 
developmental and policy-specific aspirations in his broader vision for an ‘African 
Renaissance’, based on African values including the humanist notion of Ubuntu, one 
framework was not intended to replace the other. Rather, the values embodied in the 
African Renaissance, some of which align with post-development notions of valuing 
the local and respecting traditional systems of knowing and doing, would on this 
account facilitate the arrival of modernity albeit in African guise.29 What Africans 
want, according to this vision, is integration into the global economy on fair terms, 
not to reject mainstream development in order to seek radically different alternatives. 
It may be criticised as a very top-down and statesman-led approach to pursuing 
development, as opposed to one generated from the bottom up via civil society 
movements. But it is nevertheless the approach that has largely driven developmental 
policy across the continent, including in countries like South Africa where, according 
to Brooks, participatory democracy is ‘largely considered to have failed’.30 This even 
though the African Union’s Common African Position (CAP) on the Post-2015 
Development Agenda affords civil society a prominent place in the declaration of its 
‘participatory approach’.31 
In her recent re-examination of post-development theory in Africa, Matthews 
provides several illustration of a persistent ‘desirability of development’ across the 
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continent.32 It is a continent exemplified by the aspirations of ‘modern man’, who 
embraces rather than rejects the basic components of development and which 
therefore casts doubt on the more strident of post-development theory’s assumptions 
about ‘what people want’ in developing regions (i.e., the supposed rejection of 
pursuing greater economic growth and material affluence in favour of non-material 
and non-economic measures of well-being). Matthews identifies the high-profile case 
of ‘service delivery protests’ in South Africa as an example. These protests, very 
much driven by grassroots agency, are directed against the state’s failure to deliver 
basic conditions associated with development – from access to flushing toilets to 
decent housing and jobs – and not against the notion of development itself. 33 
Critically, she argues that post-development theorists have failed to understand the 
degree to which conventional notions of development became vested with notions of 
justice and redress – i.e., the very desirability of development which is by some 
development critics all too easily dismissed simply a matter of African minds still 
being colonised.34 Having access to basic material necessities goes to the heart of 
human dignity, and the lack of such access remains a daily reminder of a previous 
colonial condition that gave rise to the current inequality in access in the first place. 
That such commitments to development are evident across the Global South 
does not necessarily mean that post-development theory amounts to a failed 
intellectual project. But it does tell us something important about the resilience of 
development defined as modernisation, and about the challenges with which twenty-
first century post-development theorist must contend: emerging and complex forms of 
modernity that retain and reanimate tradition in ways not easily accommodated by 
post-development theory, 35  as well as resilient popular support, including in 
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traditional communities, for orthodox manifestations of development36  – truly an 
elusive yet formidable hydra to be confronted by the post-development sceptic. 
Thus Sachs’s assertion that ‘[t]he idea of development stands like a ruin in the 
intellectual landscape’ is hardly the view of development suggested by Africa’s 
twenty-first century trajectory.37 Nor does his claim, that the idea of development has 
become ‘outdated’ and that, ‘above all, the hopes and desires which made the idea fly, 
are now exhausted’, seem plausible today.38 This is perhaps the most exaggerated 
statement in Sachs’s and his fellow theorists’ obituary for the Era of Development 
when judging it from the perspective of social and political developments in Africa 
today. The track record of development actors, including governments, development 
agencies and the ‘NGO industry’, has certainly been criticised.39 But the notion of a 
project that is exhausted seems an assertion too far.  
A rather troubling conceptualisation of development is inherent in this 
particular account. There seems to be something aloof, even dismissive, inherent in 
the idea that development has, in Sachs’s words, merely ‘eliminated innumerable 
varieties of being human and have turned the world into a place deprived of adventure 
and surprise’.40 There are presumably some forms of ‘adventure and surprise’ that 
those who are coping with dire poverty might conceivably want to trade for comfort 
and predictability. In this sense, post-development becomes susceptible to what 
Corbridge referred to as ‘wobbly romanticism’ – ‘only the rich get lonely, only the 
poor live hospitably and harmoniously’ – and ‘implausible politics’ – ‘we can all live 
like the Mahatma, or would want to’. 41  We may be concerned about some 
manifestations and consequences of modernity in materially wealthy societies, but it 
was not only life outside society that, in Hobbes’ vivid characterisation, was ‘nasty, 
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brutish and short’. That remains for many an apt description of life below the poverty 
line today.  
 
Africa Rising, and falling 
In contrast to the expectations embodied in the Development Dictionary and 
corresponding critiques of development, the twenty-first century saw the emergence 
of a rather more promising socio-economic trajectory of sustained economic growth 
across most of Africa, even if the World Bank points out that Africa’s economic 
diversification was rather modest and vulnerability to swings in commodity prices 
remained high.42 From this new trajectory emerged the widely heralded notion of 
Africa Rising – an idea and a bold representation of a vigorous Africa, not merely 
another policy or blueprint. It emphasised Africa’s economic growth and increasing 
foreign direct investment,43  as well as the region’s favourable demographics and 
increasing purchasing power of its emerging middle class.44 EY’s report, Africa 2030 
– Realizing the Possibilities, was representative of the new global consensus on 
Africa’s current trajectory: 
 
Despite any lingering scepticism, the evidence of the continent’s clear 
progress over the past decade is irrefutable. The reality is that a diverse range 
of African countries have now experienced consistent and robust growth for 
over a decade - certainly the longest period of sustained growth since most 
countries attained independence in the early 1960s.45  
 
Africa was no longer an outlier, a developmental failure. Instead the continent 
had begun to contribute to global economic growth and would become the locus of 
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investment and opportunity as other, more saturated regions of the Global South 
offered less impressive returns on capital. Demographers and corporations alike 
described an African Century that would make the world take note. This more 
positive analysis of the continent’s economic and developmental potential and, 
crucially, its need to industrialise is emphasised in a wide range of international and 
regional declarations and policy frameworks, such as the 2016 G20 summit in 
Hangzhou, the Sixth Tokyo International Conference on African Development held in 
Nairobi that same year, the African Union’s Agenda 2063 and the United Nations 
General Assembly resolution proclaiming the period 2016-2025 as the ‘Third 
Industrial Development Decade for Africa’. Summarising the relevance of these 
frameworks and the imperative of African industrialisation, Li Yong, Director 
General of the United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO) asserts 
that, ‘[m]y numerous meetings with African leaders and visits to dozens of countries 
… have convinced me that Africa is committed to industrialization’.46 
Then again, seemingly all good things come to an end. The claim about an 
exhaustion of the development project could be considered vindicated following the 
abrupt decline of the trajectory underpinning the notion of Africa Rising, beginning 
with the oil price crash and the end of the commodities super-cycle from around 2014 
onwards. Combined with a failure to turn sustained economic growth into significant 
diversification of national economies, the sharp loss of export earnings for Africa’s 
many commodity-dependent economies, and in particular the oil-exporting ones, has 
become a serious threat to the continent’s overall economic progress.47 Thus another 
false start, another vindication of ‘Afro-pessimism’ – the tortuous trajectory of post-
colonial Africa’s economic woes reasserting itself yet again.48 Dismissing the idea of 
Africa Rising as lacking in substance, Taylor argues that we are instead witnessing a 
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case of ‘dependency redux’ as the economic foundations of this success story are in 
fact much weaker than assumed: 
 
[T]he story of ‘Africa Rising’ is just that, a story, where growth-for-growth’s 
sake replaces development and the agenda of industrialisation and moving 
Africa up the global production chain has been discarded. Instead, Africa’s 
current ‘comparative advantage’ as a primary commodity exporter is 
reinforced, even whilst such dynamics reproduce underdevelopment. This is 
celebrated as ‘progress’.49 
 
This, then, are two tales of Africa: rising and falling. The question is whether 
Africa’s post-colonial crises can ever been transcended by means of orthodox 
development, or whether this promise is bound to remain what Rahnema insisted was 
merely a ‘deceitful mirage’?50 Pursuing development seems, however, the course that 
most African countries will choose to stay. Young argues that Africa’s post-colonial 
state has been consigned to history, as of the 1990s ‘eviscerated’ by the combined 
forces of economic decline and market reform. 51  Africans have ever since been 
forging their own identities and shaping their own goals, the colonial shadow ever 
receding. Those goals, however, remain remarkably well aligned with exogenous 
models of development on offer from the West and the rising powers of the Global 
South. The global system is in transition, but in some ways it also remains more stable 
and resilient than anticipated in terms of asymmetrical relations between its more and 
less powerful actors. African states and related actors remain marginalised in the 
international system, but also determined to improve their situation within that system 
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as currently constituted rather than seeking to radically depart from it.52 The political 
economy of energy is one area that can provide useful insights into this determination. 
 
Fossil-fuelled development  
The question of energy, how to obtain it and how to use it, is inextricably intertwined 
with the notion of modernisation and development. That is, to develop is to exploit, to 
produce and to consume. In order to do all of these things energy is (along with 
finance/credit) one of the indispensable ingredients of sustaining and reproducing the 
modern world – what Di Muzio aptly describes as our ‘petro-market civilisation’.53 In 
their introduction to Energy, Capitalism and World Order, Di Muzio and Ovadia 
explain how the harnessing of fossil fuels make possible the emergence of modern, 
industrial civilisation.54 Previously, in the ‘age of efflorescences’,55  
 
civilizations were more immediately tied to the rhythms of plant 
photosynthesis and the power of wind, water, animals and unfree labour… 
what we would today call ‘economic growth’ could flourish from time to time 
but was never sustained.56  
 
In Carbon Democracy, Mitchell takes this argument further to show that 
twentieth-century modern democracy, via the power of organised labour, grows out of 
the coal-based fossil fuel economy.57 Fossil fuel-based energy has been the ultimate 
enabler of modernity, and no other endeavour symbolises the desire for development 
more than does the craving for energy. There is furthermore a strong correlation 
between energy usage and mainstream indicators of improvements in living 
circumstances, such as the UN’s Human Development Index (HDI).58  
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In this context, then, the fact that there has emerged a big and very costly gap 
between demand and supply of energy in Africa becomes particularly relevant. 
McDonald demonstrates that, 
 
Africa is the most under-supplied region in the world when it comes to 
electricity, but its economies are utterly dependent on it. This contradiction is 
explained in part by the enormous inequalities in electricity access, with 
mining and industry receiving abundant supplies of cheap power whilst more 
than 80 percent of the continent’s residents remain off the power grid.59 
 
Kessides estimates that 25 of 48 countries in sub-Saharan Africa are 
experiencing ‘crippling’ shortages of electricity and regular blackouts, resulting in a 
loss of 2.1% of the region’s GDP.60  Mohammed, Mustafa and Bashir argue that 
‘access to modern energy is considered one of the foremost factors contributing to the 
disparity between developed and developing nations’.61 This, according to McDonald, 
is the inevitable outcome of what he terms ‘electric capitalism’.62 Electricity is ‘an 
integral part of all capitalist activity’, and since (especially southern) African 
economies are very electricity-intensive, with ambitious plans to massively increase 
electricity-generation capacity, the development of electricity markets, and energy 
markets generally, becomes a particularly useful way to understand broader dynamics 
of ‘capitalist accumulation and crisis’ on the continent.63 As but one example, the 
path-dependent nature of South Africa’s energy-intensive and dependent economy, 
and the difficulties in producing concrete alternatives to it given its strong anchoring 
in the power structures of the state, has been outlined by Fine and Rustomjee in their 
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seminal contribution on South Africa’s ‘Minerals-Energy-Complex’, and more 
recently in analyses by Baker and colleagues and Scholvin.64 
Africa’s energy gap is greater than in any other developing region, and closing 
it has now become one of the key goals for African governments and the 
organisations in Africa and abroad that co-operate with them to pursue economic 
development. As the President of the African Development Bank, Akinwumi 
Adesina, described the situation to delegates of the Bank’s annual meeting in Lusaka 
in May 2016: 
 
Children learn in the dark. Businesses operate in the dark. Surgeries are done 
in the dark. The greatest hindrance to Africa's growth and development is lack 
of electricity. It is unacceptable that 138 years after Thomas Edison developed 
the light bulb, hundreds of millions of people cannot have access to electricity 
to simply light up the bulb in Africa.65 
 
In addition to the human and economic costs of inadequate access to safe and 
reliable sources of energy, the energy gap stands today as a modern day indicator that 
indicts Africa’s failure to develop. Whether or not economists and development 
scholars labour under a ‘tyranny of GDP’ that restricts and limits the ways in which 
we are able to understand what it means to develop and how we choose to measure 
progress,66 few argue with the significance of not being able to switch on the lights 
and have them stay on. The quest for access to energy goes to the very heart of the 
desire to transcend a debilitating state of affairs in which people die from pulmonary 
disease when, in the absence of power plants delivering reliable supplies of energy, 
they have to burn wood, dung and coal; where children cannot study after dark as 
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electrical lighting is not available; and where their parents cannot afford their 
children’s education as the lack of energy stands as a key impediment to job-creating 
economic growth. 
In this context, intensifying efforts by African governments and energy 
companies in collaboration with international energy companies to exploit the 
continent’s energy resources, and in particular its oil and natural gas deposits,67 are a 
testament to the enduring determination by governments and businesses to achieve 
development by means of modernisation. The primary goal across Africa’s energy-
rich states today is not how to phase out the reliance on fossil fuels but how to more 
effectively exploit them, even if in combination with developing renewable options. 
As noted by Collier, the era of resource exploitation is nowhere near its end across 
the, when it comes to natural resources including fossil fuels, relatively underexplored 
and underdeveloped countries of the Global South.68 
Thus the political, economic and technocratic questions about bridging 
Africa’s energy gap revolve primarily around how to fully embrace and constructively 
exploit Africa’s resource wealth while at the same time avoiding the ‘resource curse’ 
that has afflicted Africa’s oil producing countries in particular.69 This, combined with 
a trajectory of increasing resource exploitation in the pursuit of economic growth and 
development, is as good an indicator as any of the lasting triumph of the Era of 
Development and the drive for modernisation. On all of these accounts, the African 
trajectory runs counter to the expectations of an exhausted development project as 
outlined in the first edition of Sachs’s Development Dictionary and by post-
development theory more generally. 
 
Turning development Green  
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It is by now also recognised that African countries will be among the ones most 
severely affected by climate change, which of course their own drives to industrialise 
and develop on the back of fossil fuels are contributing to. Consequently there are 
movements afoot across Africa whereby environmental groups, sometimes in 
collaboration with governments, push for a ‘greener’ future and are contributing to a 
reconfiguring the African state in the process.70 A transition to renewable sources of 
energy is also modestly under way and might increase to contribute two-thirds of the 
growth in demand for power by 2020.71 International agreements such as the one 
reached in Paris in 2015 will also have some impact in nudging African countries in 
the direction of low-carbon alternatives. Munang and Mgendi argue that the Paris 
Agreement on climate change presents ‘a unique opportunity… to realize the dream 
of an environmentally sustainable and economically flourishing continent.’72  
Others are however decidedly less optimistic. With an insider’s view of the 
negotiations that produced the Paris Agreement, Dimitrov argues that it: 
 
favors developed countries of the North, who won most of the key battles… 
[whereas it] is least fair to the African Group and other Least Developed 
Countries. It does not include references to their special circumstances, is 
weak on international dimensions for adaptation policy, and precludes any 
future claims for liability and compensation.73 
 
But even allowing for a move towards a ‘greening’ of African economies, the 
core aims of orthodox development – notably the pursuit of economic growth and 
increasing market shares – remain in place. Considering the development of an 
ostensibly ‘green economy’ in South Africa, the continent’s leader in renewable 
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energy investments, Death argues that it is the decidedly liberal and market-driven 
discourse of ‘green growth’ that is being prioritised by South Africa’s government: 
‘rather than a focus on limits and scarcity … the emphasis is on new markets, new 
services, and new forms of consumption’. 74  This growth model stands in stark 
contrast to other ‘discourses’ including what he terms a ‘Green revolution’, which 
entails a radical reconfiguration of economic activity to align with post-
developmental concepts such as ‘ecological virtues’ and ‘limits to growth’, and 
‘Green transformation’, which entails an ‘explicit focus on social justice, equity and 
redistribution’ where growth is a means rather than and end.75 
 
It is through focusing on South Africa’s ‘brand’ as a rising power, with a 
youthful and energetic population and a rich natural environment, and the 
country as the economic and political ‘gateway to Africa’, rather than its 
environmental and social contradictions, that South African can be positioned 
as a global leader on the green economy.76 
 
China has emerged as a key contributor to rapidly increasing investments in 
renewables across the African continent (albeit from a very low base), especially in 
solar power and in particular in South Africa.77 Shen and Power explain that Chinese 
energy companies have been ‘pushed’ into African markets ‘by the need to deal with 
over-production, excess capacity and over-investment’ at home.78 In this case too, the 
main aim is to capture new markets and, by extension, offering alternative paths to 
socio-economic development. The goal of increasing and sustaining economic 
growth, industrialisation and technological diversification – in a sense, to modernise – 
remains the same, even if it should ideally be accomplished with lower-carbon or 
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non-carbon sources of energy. Environmental sustainability is not the main goal. 
Illustrating this point, Schmitz argues that even where key actors among the rising 
powers of the Global South support policies relevant to climate change mitigation, 
such as China’s extensive involvement in renewable energy investments in Africa,  
 
[they] are not primarily concerned with environmental or climate issues. Their 
prime concerns are securing energy for the nation or particular regions, 
fostering new green industries and making them competitive, creating jobs and 
incomes in these industries or laying the foundation for increasing public 
revenue. Mitigating climate change is not irrelevant, but it tends to be a co-
benefit rather than a driver.79 
 
Thus the central role of the political economy of energy, including its new 
manifestations in renewable sources of energy and the ‘green economy’, in shaping 
twenty-first century Africa’s developmental trajectories is a key manifestation of the 
enduring legacy of the Era of Development. The emerging drive for alternatives to 
fossil fuels and achieving a low-carbon transition – granting that they should be 
successful (which remains is highly uncertain) – is manifestly not an attempt to find 
and offer alternatives to development as has been a primary ambition of the scholarly 
community of post-development theorists. Rather it is a move towards entrenching 
modernity across African societies by alternative means.  
 
Conclusion: the legacy of post-development? 
In the end we are, not surprisingly, left with a plethora of questions. While there is no 
scope to answer them all here, they are nevertheless worth acknowledging when 
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considering the continued relevance of post-development theory for Africa and the 
Global South more generally. Just as Marx was long on the failings of capitalism but 
short on the nature of socialism, post-development theory is good at generating 
questions about development, but less prolific when it comes to identifying 
alternatives thereto. This is not necessarily a problem in itself, but it does mean that 
concluding thoughts on the legacy of post-development theory are inevitably going to 
be characterised by a degree of tentativeness.  
What is the legacy of post-development theory, in Africa and across the 
Global South? Do the critiques of development as initially put forth by Sachs and 
colleagues stand vindicated? Do they have a future as meaningful, and effective, 
scholarly critiques of orthodox development thinking and practice? Can it be argued 
that, irrespective of whether or not concrete alternatives to development have been 
produced, post-development has nevertheless achieved a crucial intervention in the 
debates about development, thus forcing a change in the dominant development 
discourse by making it less replete with simplistic and taken-for-granted assumptions? 
As noted by Escobar, one of the most prominent contributors to these debates, the 
discourses themselves really do matter.80  
Or is it, alternatively, the case that post-development has had its moment in 
the sun (or at least the seminar room), only to be eclipsed by subsequent economic 
developments and by an irrepressible belief in, and attraction to, development-as-
modernisation and its attendant promise of a better life across the Global South? Is, 
therefore, the best way to understand what drives popular politics and societal change 
across the Global South today merely a case of Rostow’s fifth and final stage of 
development, the ‘Age of high mass consumption’, finally achieving the status of 
universal dogma? 81  Does the post-development ambition to move beyond the 
		 20	
modernist development discourse, by arguing for alternatives to development (but 
failing to identify them), constitute what Storey characterised as a Pontius Pilate 
politics, 82  whereby intellectuals wash their hands of the seemingly intractable 
problems of exploitation, poverty and human suffering that still afflict far too many 
people across the world – what in Kiely’s and Corbridge’s vivid dismissals of post-
development amounts to a detached and even insidious form of Ivory Tower 
romanticising of the Noble Savage and of global poverty?83 It is not an entirely 
straightforward judgment to make.  
What seems clear is that, for at least the middle classes and more secure 
working classes of the Global South that have escaped the historical misery of the 
lumpenproletariat and modern day ‘precariat’, decades of economic globalisation 
have coincided with significant improvements in living circumstances. The problem is 
that those benefits have not been distributed evenly. The so-called Elephant Curve 
illustrates clearly who are the winners (middle and working classes across the Global 
South, and the very wealthy in the Western world), and losers (the very poorest across 
the Global South and the working and middle classes of the West) in a world of 
increasing economic globalisation.84 It is therefore difficult to accept assertions such 
as those made by Andrews and Bawa, that globalisation is ‘inherently bad for the 
poor’.85 The existence of substantial numbers of winners, even among many losers, is 
furthermore significant because it makes a comprehensive, coherent and sustained 
challenge to the status quo on development that post-development theory aspires to 
that much more difficult and therefore unlikely. 
So what do these developments entail for the legacy and continued relevance 
of post-development theory? It is evident that orthodox development strategies have 
produced significant winners across the Global South, if less so in Africa. This is the 
		 21	
case even if development as conventionally understood and pursued will never 
become a panacea for all of the world’s poor – neither perfect positive-sum game, nor 
inevitably zero-sum. To the extent that these beneficiaries of development gain a 
more prominent voice in public discourses and national politics across the world, 
including in Africa (even though the continent remains home to so many of those who 
have not yet benefitted), we can expect that the ideational influence and normative 
power of development by means of economic growth and modernisation will remain 
an attractive proposal.  
There are those who may find little hope in what is on offer and may therefore 
give up on development, considering it the ultimate pretence and diversion in an 
unsustainable world. But the idea and promise of development retains for a vast 
majority of the world’s population the potency it has acquired since the 
Enlightenment and industrial revolution. Indeed, Matthews begins her recent analysis 
of the relevance of post-development theory to Africa by acknowledging that Sachs, 
in the preface to the new edition of his Development Dictionary, now recognises that 
the Global South has become ‘the staunchest defender of development’.86 Indeed, he 
has come to recognise the extent to which the idea of development has ‘been charged 
with hopes for redress and self-affirmation’. 87  This intertwining of the idea of 
development with desires for justice and improvement across the Global South is in 
line with the argument pursued throughout this article. Thus to offer something more 
appealing and attractive than what has manifestly become a primary pursuit of 
societies worldwide in the Era of Development remains the challenge for 
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